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Movement forward to the British positions was difficult in daylight, due to a lack of communication trenches, so Indian troops moved along wet ditches in the dark and conducted the relief over two nights. Exchanging two battalions took about 2½ hours and a German attack on 30 October pushed a Gurkha battalion back and exposed the flank of the neighbouring battalion until a counter-attack could be arranged to regain the line. Early on 31 October, Willcocks, the Indian Corps commander, took over from Smith-Dorrien from Givenchy to Fauquissart, who left about ten severely depleted infantry battalions and most of the corps artillery behind. The II Corps troops had been promised ten days to rest but troop movements towards Wytschaete began immediately, some on foot and some by bus. On 1 November the last seven battalions in the area were sent north to Bailleul behind III Corps. The 5th Division artillery was sent north to the Cavalry Corps by 2 November and the remaining II Corps engineer companies built more field fortifications. The French had been able to use the undamaged railways behind their front to move troops more quickly than the Germans, who had to take long detours, wait for repairs to damaged tracks and replace rolling stock. The French IV Corps moved from Lorraine on 2 September in 109 trains and had assembled by 6 September. The French had been able to move troops in up to 200 trains per day and use hundreds of motor-vehicles which were co-ordinated by two staff officers, Commandant Gérard and Captain Doumenc. The French used Belgian and captured German rail wagons and the domestic telephone and telegraph systems. The initiative held by the Germans in August was not recovered as all troop movements to the right flank were piecemeal. Until the end of the Siege of Maubeuge (24 August – 7 September) only the single line from Trier to Liège, Brussels, Valenciennes and Cambrai was available and had to be used to supply the German armies on the right as the 6th Army travelled in the opposite direction, limiting the army to forty trains a day which took four days to move a corps. Information on German troop movements from wireless interception enabled the French to forestall German moves but the Germans had to rely on reports from spies, which were frequently wrong. The French resorted to more cautious infantry tactics, using cover to reduce casualties and a centralised system of control as the German army commanders followed contradictory plans. The French did not need quickly to obtain a decisive result and could concentrate on preserving the French army.

投稿日時 - 2019-04-28 00:03:39

QNo.9611269

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>Movement forward to the British positions was difficult in daylight, due to a lack of communication trenches, so Indian troops moved along wet ditches in the dark and conducted the relief over two nights. Exchanging two battalions took about 2½ hours and a German attack on 30 October pushed a Gurkha* battalion back and exposed the flank of the neighbouring battalion until a counter-attack could be arranged to regain the line. Early on 31 October, Willcocks, the Indian Corps commander, took over from Smith-Dorrien from Givenchy to Fauquissart, who left about ten severely depleted infantry battalions and most of the corps artillery behind.
⇒通信塹壕を欠いていたことで日中の英国軍陣地への移動は困難であったため、インド軍は暗闇の中で濡れた溝渠に沿って移動し、2夜にわたって救援を行った。2個の大隊を交換するのに約2時間半かかり、10月30日のドイツ軍攻撃でグルカ*大隊が押し戻され、反撃で戦線を取り戻すことができるようになるまで隣接大隊の側面が露出された。10月31日朝、インド軍団の司令官ウィルコックスはジバンシーからフォーキサートまでをスミス=ドリアンから引き継いだ。激しく消耗した約10個の歩兵大隊と残りの軍団砲兵隊の大部分が残されていた。
*Gurkha:ネパール人傭兵のグルカ族。ネパールの主要民族で、勇猛なことで知られる。

>The II Corps troops had been promised ten days to rest but troop movements towards Wytschaete began immediately, some on foot and some by bus. On 1 November the last seven battalions in the area were sent north to Bailleul behind III Corps. The 5th Division artillery was sent north to the Cavalry Corps by 2 November and the remaining II Corps engineer companies built more field fortifications. The French had been able to use the undamaged railways behind their front to move troops more quickly than the Germans, who had to take long detours, wait for repairs to damaged tracks and replace rolling stock. The French IV Corps moved from Lorraine on 2 September in 109 trains and had assembled by 6 September.
⇒第II軍団の軍隊は10日の休息を約束されていたが、ウィツシェトへ向けての軍隊の移動がすぐに始まった。11月1日、この地域最後の7個大隊が第III軍団背後のバイユールに送られた。第5師団砲兵隊は11月2日までに北の騎兵隊軍団に送られ、残りの第II軍団の工兵中隊が多くの野戦砦を建設した。フランス軍は、前線背後の損傷していない線路を使ってドイツ軍より速く軍隊を移動することができた。ドイツ軍は、長い迂回路を利用し、損傷した線路の修理を待ち、車両を交換しなければならなかったのである。フランス軍第IV軍団は9月2日にロレーヌから109本の列車で移動し、9月6日までに集結していた。

>The French had been able to move troops in up to 200 trains per day and use hundreds of motor-vehicles which were co-ordinated by two staff officers, Commandant Gérard and Captain Doumenc. The French used Belgian and captured German rail wagons and the domestic telephone and telegraph systems. The initiative held by the Germans in August was not recovered as all troop movements to the right flank were piecemeal. Until the end of the Siege of Maubeuge (24 August – 7 September) only the single line from Trier to Liège, Brussels, Valenciennes and Cambrai was available and had to be used to supply the German armies on the right as the 6th Army travelled in the opposite direction, limiting the army to forty trains a day which took four days to move a corps.
⇒フランス軍は1日最大200本の列車で軍隊を移動させ、2人の担当将校ジェラール指揮官とドゥーメン大尉によって調整された何百台もの自動車を使用することができた。フランス軍はベルギー軍を使ってドイツ軍の貨車や国内用電話電信システムを攻略した。8月にドイツ軍が維持していた主導権は、全軍隊の右側面への移動が全て断片的だったため、回復しなかった。モベージュの包囲戦が終了するまで(8月24日-9月7日)、トリアーからリエージュ、ブリュッセル、バレンシエンヌ、カンブレーまでの1本線のみが利用可能で、もっぱらこれが右翼のドイツ軍への補給のために使われた。一方、第6方面軍は反対方向に移動したが、1日40列車に制限されたので、1個軍団の移動に4日かかった。

>Information on German troop movements from wireless interception enabled the French to forestall German moves but the Germans had to rely on reports from spies, which were frequently wrong. The French resorted to more cautious infantry tactics, using cover to reduce casualties and a centralised system of control as the German army commanders followed contradictory plans. The French did not need quickly to obtain a decisive result and could concentrate on preserving the French army.
⇒無線の傍受によってドイツ軍の移動に関する情報が入ったので、フランス軍はドイツ軍の移動を未然に防ぐことができた。他方ドイツ軍はスパイからの報告に頼らざるを得なかったが、それはしばしば誤報であった。ドイツ軍司令部が矛盾する計画を続ける一方で、フランス軍はより慎重な歩兵戦術を採用して死傷者の削減と中央制御方式の指揮を計った。フランス軍としては、迅速で決定的な結果を得る必要はなかったので、フランス方面軍の保護に集中することができた。

「お礼コメント」を拝見しました。
>質問No.9605590です、失礼いたしました。
⇒せっかく再度のお知らせを頂ましたが、私の文書には質問No.9605590がありませんでした。それで、OKWaveページ上で確認しましたところ、質問No.9605589とNo.9605590が連続的に欠落していることを発見しました。もしかしたら、一度投稿されて質問番号がついた後で、何らかの間違いでそれらが削除されたのではないかと推測されますが、どうでしょうか。

投稿日時 - 2019-05-01 10:53:33

お礼

有難うございました。もしかしたらそうかもしれません。態々有難うございました。今後誤りが無いよう注意致します。

投稿日時 - 2019-05-01 15:48:03

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